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A determination that the retired employees in this case are covered
by the Act and that their benefits are mandatory subjects of bargaining
raises quite a few questions that neither the Board nor the court has
answered. For example; does the principle apply to all industrial pen-
sioners or only to those pensioned pursuant to a collectively bargained
contract; will pensioners now be allowed to participate in certification
elections, and, if so, to what extent; may the parties bargain for a decrease
in benefits, and may the employer decrease them if there is an impasse in
bargaining? No reason appears why these questions must be settled before
they arise in an actual case and, thus, the existence of these and other
questions should not prevent affirmance of the Board's decision.
The court set forth no convincing arguments that the Board's decision
will not effectuate the policies of the Act unless one accepts the premise
that retirees were never intended to be protected by the Act. It is difficult
to say that the Board's position is unreasonable or even unsupported by
substantial evidence. Therefore, in a close case such as this the court
should defer to the policy determinations of the Board. If the Board has
acted contrary to the will of Congress, Congress has the power to overrule
the Board.
GEORGE S. KING, JR.
Workmen's Compensation-What Is the Range of Compensable
Consequences of A Work-Related Injury?
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Starr v. Charlotte Paper Co.'
recently considered the extent to which an employer, liable for the first
injury, may be held accountable under the North Carolina Workmen's
Compensation Act for secondary injuries subsequently incurred by its
former employee. On October 8, 1963, while employed by the defendant,
Starr suffered a spinal injury causing total paralysis from the waist down.
In lieu of weekly compensation benefits, Starr settled with the employer
for thirty-five thousand dollars. The North Carolina Industrial Com-
mission entered an order approving the settlement with the exception
that it was not in satisfaction of subsequent hospital and nursing expenses
incurred as a result of the injury.
Due to his condition, Starr could move about only with the aid of a
wheelchair and had frequent muscle spasms in his legs. On March 17,
'8 N.C. App. 604, 175 S.E.2d 342, cert. denied, 277 N.C. 112, - S.E.2d -
(1970).
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1969, six years after the first injury, he was awakened by muscle spasms
which he managed to quiet by massaging his legs. The claimant then lit
a cigarette. When his legs again began to contract, he placed the cigarette
in an ash tray on his wheelchair beside the bed and again massaged his
legs. After he drifted off to sleep, his sheets came into contact with the
cigarette and began smoldering. Starr was finally awakened by the smell
of smoke but by this time had suffered second and third degree burns over
the lower half of his body, which resulted in his being hospitalized for
seventy-three days.
The claimant brought a claim against his former employer for the
hospital expenses and was awarded compensation by the Industrial Com-
mission. Charlotte Paper Co. appealed, charging that the previous acci-
dent was not the proximate cause of the claimant's subsequent injuries, but
that they were proximately caused by his smoking in bed. In affirming
the award, the North Carolina Court of Appeals relied on a liberal con-
struction of the workmen's compensation act to find that the injury "arose
out of" the employment.' Noting that the claimant's failure to properly
extinguish the cigarette was a "simple act of forgetfulness,"' the court
stated that recovery was allowed even when the employment was not the
"sole causative force"4 of an injury. In addition, the court held that
every direct and natural consequence of a prior injury is compensable
unless there has been an intervening cause attributable to "claimant's own
intentional conduct."5 Any negligence on the part of the claimant not
amounting to intentional conduct was thus disregarded.'
The North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act allows recovery
for "injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of employ-
ments."'7 "Arising out of" as used in the act requires that the injury have
its origin in the employment," be traceable to the employment,9 or spring
from the employment."0 Thus, an injury occurring subsequent in time to
2Id. at 609-10, 175 S.E.2d at 346.
8Id.
'Id.
Id. at 611, 175 S.E.2d at 347.
6Id.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §97-2(6) (1965).
' Taylor v. Twin City Club, 260 N.C. 435, 438, 132 S.E.2d 865, 868 (1963);
Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 91, 63 S.E.2d 173, 175 (1951).
9Horn v. Sandhill Furn. Co., 245 N.C. 173, 176, 95 S.E.2d 521, 523 (1956);
Poteete v. North State Pyrophyllite Co., 240 N.C. 561, 564, 82 S.E.2d 693, 694




the prior compensable injury would have its origin in the employment if
there were "some causal relation"11 between the two injuries. One cause
of Starr's bums was the muscle spasms that awakened him and arguably
led to his failure to extinguish the cigarette. Furthermore, he would have
been awakened by the burning of his flesh had he any feeling in his legs. 2
Thus, there was "some causal relation" between the injury and the prior
compensable injury, so that the bums could be said to have "arisen out
of the employment."
The real difficulty of analysis in statutory terms is encountered when
the "in the course of the employment" inquiry is made. "In the course of
the employment' refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the
accident.'" Because secondary injuries of the type under consideration
here do not occur in the job context, some courts limit their inquiry to a
determination of whether the injury arose out of the employment, 4 in-
dicating that all that is necessary for recovery for subsequent injuries is
caustion in the but-for sense. "So long as the original injury operates even
in part as a contributing factor [of the second injury] it establishes liabil-
ity."' 5 Using this language, recovery for the subsequent swimming death
of a quadruple amputee could be allowed if his limbs had been lost as a
result of a prior compensable injury. A man with a broken hand could
recover for re-injury incurred as a result of a boxing match,' or one
suffering from vertigo as a result of a prior injury could recover for sub-
sequently falling off a ladder.' If some inquiry in addition to "arising
out of the employment" is not made, recovery for the off-the-job injury
will be broader than for the original injury,'8 and workmen's compensation
11Id.
128 N.C. App. at 609, 175 S.E.2d at 346.
12Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C. App. 448, 455, 162 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1952).
'4 See, e.g., State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 1 Cal. Rptr. 73,
176 Cal. App. 2d 862 (1959); Colvin v. Emmons & Whitehead, 216 App. Div. 577,
215 N.Y.S. 562 (Sup. Ct 1926).
1 State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 176 Cal. App. 2d 862, -
1 Cal. Rptr. 73, 78 (1959).
" 1 A. LARSON, LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 13.11, at 192.65-.66
(1968) [hereinafter cited as LARSON].
17 Colvin v. Emmons & Whitehead, 216 App. Div. 577, 215 N.Y.S. 562 (Sup.
Ct. 1926). See also Note, Workmai's Compensation: Arising out of Employment:
Chain of Causation between Compensable Injury and Subsequent Injury, Aggrava-
tion or Reinjury: Negligence of Worknan as Independent Interveninq Case:
Swanson v. Willians & Co., 278 App. Div. 477, 106 N.Y.S.2d 61 (3d Dep't 1951),
aff'd without opinion, 304 N.Y. 624, 107 N.E.2d 96 (1952), 38 CORNELL L.Q. 99
(1952).
8 Recovery is not allowed for the original injury if it was occasioned by intoxica-
tion or if it was willfully inflicted. If "arising out of the employment" is the only
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will be extended into the proscribed field of general health and accident in-
surance. 19
Due to the nonapplicability of the "in the course of the employment"
inquiry to subsequent off-the-job injuries and the recognition that all
secondary injuries were not intended to be compensable,20 courts have
sought some concept to limit the employer's liability for a causally related
injury.2' Accordingly, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, and most
other courts considering the problem, require that in addition to "some
causal relation" the subsequent injury be proximately caused by the
prior compensable injury.' "The proximate cause doctrine ... requires
that the original injury be one of the direct and natural causes of the
subsequent injury,"'' or compensation will be denied.24
Thus, there is a reentry of common law proximate cause into the
formula for recovery under the workmen's compensation acts. One
element of proximate causation is foreseeability. Foreseeability was elim-
inated by the North Carolina act as a requirement for compensation for
on-the-job injuries25 because it is
requirement for compensability for a subsequent injury, recovery might be allowed
where it was in part occasioned by the employee's intoxication under a literal
application of this language. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1965).
9 Workmen's Compensation Acts are not to be construed so liberally as to pro-
vide general health and accident insurance. Bryan v. First Free Will Baptist
Church, 267 N.C. 111, 115, 147 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1966); Martin v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 5 N.C. App. 37, 41, 167 S.E.2d 790, 792-93 (1969). See generally Note, 38
CORNELL L.Q., supra note 17, at 103-04.20 See authorities cited note 19 supra.
"_Arguably, there are several provisions in the North Carolina Workmen's
Compensation Act that evidence a legislative intent that subsequent injuries not be
compensable at all. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-24(a) (1965) (all claims are barred
unless filed within two years of a compensable accident); § 97-24(c) (1965) (all
records of the Industrial Commission can be destroyed five years after all reports
are filed); § 97-47 (1965) (an employee can move for review of the award if
there has been a change in his condition). See also Lee v. Roses 5-10-250 Stores,
205 N.C. 310, 171 S.E. 87 (1953).
" See, e.g., Great A&P Tea Co. v. Hill, 201 Md. 630, 636, 95 A.2d 84, 87 (1953);
Dickerson v. Essex Co., 2 App. Div. 2d 516, -, 157 N.Y.S.2d 94, 96 (Sup. Ct.
1956); Gower v. Mackes, 184 Pa. Super. 41, 45-46, 132 A.2d 880, 882 (1957).
8 N.C. App. at 610, 175 S.E.2d at 347. See also Coble v. Player Realty &
Constr. Co., North Carolina Industrial Acc. Comm'n Docket No. A-7243 (1951).
" See, e.g., Yarbrough v. Polar Ice & Fuel Co., 118 Ind. App. 321, 79 N.E.2d 422
(1948); Adkins v. Rives Plating Corp., 338 Mich. 265, 61 N.W.2d 117 (1953);
Sullivan v. B&A Constr., Inc., 307 N.Y. 161, 120 N.E.2d 694 (1954). See also
Note, Workmenw's Compensation--Accident or Injury and Consequences Thereof-
Subsequent Injuries, 19 U. Cxx. L. Rxv. 304, 305 (1950).
" North Carolina does not require that the original injury be foreseeable. See,
e.g., Taylor v. Twin City Club, 260 N.C. 435, 438, 132 S.E.2d 865, 868 (1963);
Withers v. Black, 230 N.C. 428, 433, 53 S.E.2d 668, 672 (1949); Ashley v. F-W
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out of place in compensation law because, as developed in tort law, it
[is] a concept which [is] . .. thoroughly suffused with the idea of
fault; that is, it [is] a theory of causation designed to bring about a
just result when starting from an act containing some element of fault.
The primary test of legal cause in the United States is foresee-
ability . . . . [b]ut foreseeability has no relevance if one is not in-
terested in the culpability of the actor's conduct.26
Since the fault of the employer is equally irrelevant in the context of
secondary injuries, common law foreseeability has no place in the deter-
mination of compensability. With the dismissal of foreseeability, proximate
cause is limited to meaning the absence of an intervening cause.
2 7
Once the doctrine of intervening cause raises its head, the employee's
negligence as an intervening cause must be reckoned with even though the
workmen's compensation acts eliminated any inquiry into negligence in
the formula for recovery. "[N]ot even gross negligence is [to be] a
defense to a compensation claim."2  Courts have avoided this seemingly
anomalous situation by asserting that the inquiry into employee negligence
is not made to bar recovery for contributory negligence but to determine
the legal cause of the claimant's injury-his own intervening negligence
or the prior injury.2 9 Accordingly, most courts have required something
more than mere negligence by the employee to break the chain of causation
and relieve the employer of liability.s0 What constitutes mere negligence
is determinative of liability in most subsequent injury cases. Thus, the
court of appeals in Starr held that Starr's failure to extinguish his
cigarette was a "simple act of forgetfulness . . . insufficient to break the
chain of causation between the original injury and the burns sustained.""1
The assertion that an inquiry into the claimant's negligence is not
made to deny recovery for contributory negligence but to determine if
the negligence is the legal cause of the injury provides a weak justification
Chevrolet Co., 222 N.C. 25, 27, 21 S.E.2d 834, 835 (1942). See also 5 J. STRONG,
NORTH CAnoLINA INDEx 2D Master & Servant § 55, at 399-400 (1968).
26 Larson, Range of Compensable Consequences in Workman's Compensation,
21 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 610 (1970)."7 Note, 19 U. CIN. L. REv., supra note 24, at 305.
"8Hartley v. North Carolina Prison Dep't, 258 N.C. 287, 289, 128 S.E.2d 598,
600 (1962).2 3 Note, 38 CORNELL L.Q., supra note 17, at 101.
308 N.C. App. at 610, 175 S.E.2d at 346 (simple act of forgetfullness). Accord,
Swanson v. Williams & Co., 278 App. Div. 477, -, 106 N.Y.S.2d 61, 66 (Sup. Ct.
1951) (carelessness or error in judgment); Anderson v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n,
116 Wash. 421, 423, 199 P. 747, 748 (1921) (imprudence). See generay, LARSON
§ 13.12, at 192.76. But see Note, 30 TENN. L. Rnv. 322, 324 (1963)."18 N.C. App. at 609-10, 175 S.E.2d at 346.
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for insinuating negligence back into the formula for recovery. If the
question as to whether the claimant's negligence was an intervening or only
a contributing cause is a guide to recovery, why should the same inquiry
not be made in regard to on-the-job injuries? The court, if it found the
claimant's negligence an intervening cause, could report that it was denying
recovery because the negligence and not the job caused the injury. How-
ever, as we have seen, even gross intervening negligence will not prevent
recovery for one-the-job injuries.32
If the concept of proximate causation cannot be tested by inquiry into
foreseeability or by the use of intervening causation,83 it is useless in
defining the situations where compensation for causally related subsequent
injuries should be allowed. 4 Nevertheless, it could hardly be said that
the act was intended to compensate the employee for every secondary in-
jury suffered due to the interaction of the previous injury and sub-
sequent conduct and events.35 The North Carolina Workmen's Com-
pensation Act relieves the employer from responsibility for the original
injury if it was occasioned by the employee's intoxication or if he will-
fully inflicted the injury on himself. 0 Arguably then, some limitation
should be placed on the employer's liability for a subsequent injury even
where there is some causal relation to the prior injury. For example,
if an employee became a quadruple amputee as a result of a prior com-
pensable injury and later attempted to swim the English Channel, it
would be ludicrous to hold the employer liable for his drowning death.
If neither the traditional "in the course of the employment" inquiry
nor the concept of proximate cause is fitted to determining the range of
compensable consequences of a prior, causally related compensable injury,
how is the court to define those situations where such injuries will be
" See, e.g., Hartley v. North Carolina Prison Dep't, 258 N.C. 287, 289, 128
S.E.2d 598, 600 (1962); Howell v. Standard Ice & Fuel Co., 226 N.C. 730, 732,
40 S.E.2d 197, 198 (1946).
"' This is not to imply that foreseeability and intervening causation are preclusive
tests of proximate cause. They are, however, the traditonal tests used to insert
some certainty into the concept. Because most courts rely on these terms, they
will be relied on here.
" The North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act does not speak of prox-
imate cause as a test of liability. Conjecturally, it might have been intentionally
avoided. For that reason alone, the term should be avoided in workmen's com-
pensation cases.
" "[B]ecause of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the
law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point." Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 352, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928) (Andrews, J., dis-
senting).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1965).
[Vol. 49
WORK-RELATED INJURY
compensable? Professor Larson has been one of the few commentators to
address himself to this problem.3 7 His solution is to divide all employee
conduct occurring subsequent to the first compensable injury into two
categories: that necessarily and reasonably undertaken because of the
prior injury" and that undertaken for other reasons.3 9 The former cat-
egory is delineated as "quasi [in the] course of [the] employment""0
activity, the latter, non-"quasi [in the] course of." The range of com-
pensable consequences for "quasi in the course of" activity extends to
any subsequent injury not incurred as a result of the claimant's intentional
conduct."1 Thus, there would be recovery for injuries incurred during
a trip to the doctor's office for treatment of a prior injury even if the
claimant was negligent in some aspect of the trip. If the activity in which
the claimant was engaged at the time of the second injury were not
undertaken because of the prior injury, recovery would be denied by the
Larson rule if there were any culpability greater than "mere" negli-
gence.4" Professor Larson's use of intentional and negligent conduct as
determining the outer limits of the range of compensable consequences
for a work-related injury still focuses the court's attention on intervening
and thus proximate causation as a limitation on recovery. Such an analysis
is subject to the same criticism as a proximate cause inquiry unrefined by
"quasi course of" language.43
Most courts have recognized that industry should bear the burden for
secondary injuries where the causal relation is sufficiently strong44 and
where the employee was not injured while engaged in activity highly
dangerous for one in his condition.4" Compensation for second injuries
is denied where there is no proof of any causal relation or where claimant
was reinjured while engaged in conduct highly unreasonable for one in
his condition.4 Denial of compensation in the first situation can best be
"'See 1 LmsoN §§ 13.00-.12.
88 Id.
I' Id. § 13.11, at 192.70-71.
'OId. at 192.68.
.Id.
4 Professor Larson relates that it takes something more than mere carelessness
on the part of the employee to relieve the employer of liability even though the em-
ployee is outside the "quasi-course" of the employment. Id. at 192.70-.71.
8 See pp. 587-88 supra.
" Cf. 1 LARSON § 13.11, at 192.67.
" Adkins v. Rives Plating Corp., 338 Mich. 265, 272, 61 N.W.2d 117, 120
(1953) ; Jones v. Huey, 210 Tenn. 162, 167, 357 S.W.2d 47, 49 (1962) ; McDougle
v. Department of Labor & Indus., 64 Wash. 2d 640, 644, 393 P.2d 631, 635 (1964).
" See authorities cited note 45 supra.
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explained in terms of lack of sufficient causal relation to hold that the
injury arose out of the employment. The courts usually deny liability
in the latter situation after a determination that the activity in which
the claimant was engaged when injured was not a normal one for a
person in his condition. In proximate cause terms the activity would be
called intervening negligence, and compensation would therefore be denied.
However, instead of couching the inquiry in terms of proximate causation,
less confusion and more consistent results4 7 would be achieved if the
limitation were versed in the very terms by which it is reached, i.e., was
the activity a normal one for a person placed in plaintiff's physical and
mental condition by the prior compensable injury.4" This inquiry may seem
a return to the concept of foreseeability, condemned in workmen's com-
pensation law ;49 however, it does not require that the claimants's second
injury be foreseen by either him or the employer. Thus to be com-
pensable, the injury must occur during participation in activities that,
viewed in retrospect, are normal and expected and there must be some
causal relation between the two injuries.
The suggested method of limiting recovery would eliminate the con-
fusion 0 resulting from an analysis based on proximate cause although
the end result in terms of liability may be the same. Proximate cause
is essentially a policy determination as to whether legal responsibility
' The differences as to what the term "proximate cause" means to different
courts is shown by the wide divergence in results on similar fact situations in work-
men's compensation cases. Compare Wallace v. Judd Brown Constr. Co., 269 Minn.
455, 131 N.W.2d 540 (1964), with Prentice v. Weeks, 239 App. Div. 227, 267
N.Y.S. 849 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 264 N.Y. 507, 191 N.E. 538 (1933); Adkins v. Rives
Plating Corp., 338 Mich. 265, 61 N.W.2d 117 (1953), with Colvin v. Emmons &
Whitehead, 216 App. Div. 577, 215 N.Y.S. 562 (Sup. Ct. 1926) ; Fischer v. R. Hoe
& Co., 224 App. Div. 335, 230 N.Y.S. 755 (Sup. Ct. 1928), with Whiting-Mead
Commercial Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 178 Cal. 505, 173 P. 1105 (1918).
,' This test is closely akin to the "direct and natural result" of a prior com-
pensable injury formulation announced in Starr. It is superior, however, because
it diverts the court from all mention of proximate cause.
"' See pp. 586-87 supra.
"The confusion caused the court by use of the concept of proximate causation
as a limitation on recovery, even when the test is couched in terms of "quasi-
course" of the employment, can be seen in Starr. There, the court cited Larson's
treatise for the proposition that a claimant is allowed recovery for all consequences
of his prior injury unless they occurred as a result of his intentional conduct. 8 N.C.
App. at 611, 175 S.E.2d at 347. Accordingly, Starr's smoking in bed was held not to
be an intervening cause of the bums. Professor Larson, however, would require
that the claimant's smoking in bed be an activity reasonably and necessarily under-
taken because of the prior compensable injury or anything greater than the claim-
ant's mere negligence would bar recovery. 1 Larsen § 13.12, at 192.76. The court,
however, made no finding that Starr's smoking in bed was reasonable or necessary.
[Vol, 49
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should be imposed on one person for injuries incurred by another.5 Rather
than making this policy determination by using proximate cause with its
myriad of meanings52 and connotation of fault,13 the court should ascertain
whether the injury had sufficient causal relation to the prior injury and
subsequently occurred in the course of activities normally expected to be
undertaken by one in the claimant's condition. 4 Thus, in Starr, it might
be said that smoking in bed was a normal activity for a paraplegic. Fur-
thermore it is to be expected that an injured employee will engage in a
certain amount of careless or even negligent activity. It is only when he
embarks on a course of conduct that is highly unreasonable for one in his
condition that he departs from the course of normal activities.
Even though, arguably, Starr was correctly decided,55 the court should
not use a highly technical and amorphous term such as proximate cause
to determine the range of compensable consequences in workmen's com-
pensation cases. If the use of proximate cause is not abandoned, the
doctrines of tort law and workmen's compensation law will eventually
fuse even though the avoidance of the common law concepts was one of the
main justifications for the original passage of the workmen's compensa-
tion acts.56
C. Hl. POPE, JR.
Cf. W. PROSSER, LAw oF TORTS § 49, at 282 (3d ed. 1964).See note 47 supra.
' See note 26 supra.
""Normal and expected" are used here not as a suggestion that foreseeability
is required but in the sense that in retrospect the claimant's conduct is not sur-
prising.
" Whether Starr's recovery should have been allowed hinges on whether smoking
in bed was a normal and expected activity for a person subject to having muscle
spasms. A paraplegic could not be expected to get out of bed every time he
smoked a cigarette.
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